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Notes 
Executive Foreign Affairs Power  
and Immigration Relief 
MITCHELL R. VANLANDINGHAM* 
This Note addresses whether the president may take action on immigration as an 
exercise of foreign affairs power. In particular, it focuses on DACA and DAPA, two 
Obama-era policies of deferred action for certain classes of undocumented 
immigrants. Exactly how much authority a president and his executive 
departments should have over immigration without running afoul of Congress’s 
Article I power “to create a uniform Rule of Naturalization” is still unsettled. 
Furthermore, it is shaded in public debate by partisan views on immigration and 
how much power a given party thinks its own president should have.  
 
As immigrants still formally owe their allegiance to a foreign sovereign, might the 
executive branch perform lenient or ameliorative actions over them via executive 
foreign affairs power? Would that only add to the trend of creating a more 
monarchical presidency? What would the boundaries of this power look like? This 
Note posits that presidential foreign affairs authority, based on past practice, 
supports the president’s power to offer limited forms of immigration relief, at least 
in the absence of clear congressional prohibition, if the president judges that 
denying such relief might have foreign affairs consequences. 
	
 *  J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2018; A.B. University of 
California, Davis. The Author gratefully acknowledges the input of Professor Zachary Price and the 
Hastings Law Journal Notes Committee, as well as the support of the Hastings Law Journal and Erica 
Kalingking. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Undocumented immigration1 has become a polemical issue in 
American politics. In 2012 and 2014 respectively, the Secretary of 
Homeland Security announced two policies styled as prosecutorial 
discretion: Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”)2 and 
	
 1. Undocumented immigrants arrive or remain in a given country without that country’s 
authorization. Even though statutes, prior case law, and public discourse have used a number of terms 
here (including “illegal aliens,” “illegal immigrants,” and “undocumented noncitizens”), I use the term 
“undocumented immigrant” for this Note, when not quoting an authority that uses another term. 
 2. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., EXERCISING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION WITH RESPECT TO 
INDIVIDUALS WHO CAME TO THE UNITED STATES AS CHILDREN (June 15, 2012), 
https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/s1-exercising-prosecutorial-discretion-individuals-who-came-
to-us-as-children.pdf [hereinafter DACA MEMORANDUM]. 
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Deferred Action for Parents of Americans (“DAPA”).3 These policies 
allowed undocumented immigrants who came to the United States as 
children, or the undocumented immigrant parents of citizens or lawful 
permanent residents, to apply for a limited term, nonbinding assurance 
from the federal government that removal proceedings would not be 
initiated against them, provided they met certain conditions. The legal, 
congressional, and academic challenges to DACA and DAPA framed the 
issue as an abuse of prosecutorial discretion¾either as an abrogation of 
rulemaking procedures or of the executive’s law enforcement duties.4 
Are these the only ways to approach the issue? The executive has 
plenary power over foreign affairs and interaction with foreign nations.5 
Since undocumented immigrants are usually still the citizens of a 
foreign sovereign, might the executive have power over immigration by 
virtue of its foreign affairs power? If so, what are the ramifications of 
this for the Trump administration, led by a president known for 
hardline rhetoric against undocumented immigration?6 
During the arguments on the stay of President Donald Trump’s 
first “travel ban” executive order, at least one attorney for the federal 
government alluded to a judicial inability to review executive actions on 
immigration.7 This argument invoked the president’s plenary power 
over foreign affairs. This reasoning raises the issue of whether the 
president has plenary, unchecked power over immigration in every 
situation. Assuredly, such absolute power would not square with the 
	
 3. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., EXERCISING PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION WITH RESPECT TO 
INDIVIDUALS WHO CAME TO THE UNITED STATES AS CHILDREN AND WITH RESPECT TO CERTAIN 
INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE THE PARENTS OF U.S. CITIZENS OR PERMANENT RESIDENTS (Nov. 20, 2014), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/14_1120_memo_deferred_action.pdf 
[hereinafter DAPA MEMORANDUM]. 
 4. See infra Part II. 
 5. See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–20 (1936); 
Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2094 (2015). 
 6. See, e.g., Donald J. Trump, Speech Accepting the Republican Party’s Nomination for 
President (July 21, 2016), https://assets.donaldjtrump.com/DJT_Acceptance_Speech.pdf (“We are 
going to build a great border wall to stop illegal immigration, to stop the gangs and the violence, and 
to stop the drugs from pouring into our communities.”). 
 7. See Brief for Appellants at 2, Washington v. Trump, 847 F.3d 1151 (9th Cir. 2017) (No.  
17-35105), 2017 WL 511013 at *2 (“‘[T]he power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign 
prerogative . . . .’ [The district court’s injunction] also contravenes the considered judgment of 
Congress that the President should have the unreviewable authority to suspend the admission of 
any class of aliens.” (quoting Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982)) (emphasis added)). See 
generally Exec. Order No. 13769 82 Fed. Reg. 8,977 (Jan. 27, 2017) (“Protecting the Nation from 
Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States”) (establishing the basis for the Washington v. Trump 
litigation). In recent times, the Trump Administration has embraced the concept of executive action 
unreviewability. See, e.g., Face the Nation (CBS television broadcast Feb. 12, 2017) (“[T]he powers of 
the President to protect our country are very substantial and will not be questioned,” said 
presidential senior advisor Stephen Miller). 
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Constitution’s overarching theme of defining boundaries for federal 
power.  
This Note proposes that presidential foreign affairs authority, 
based on past practice, supports the president’s power to offer limited 
forms of immigration relief, at least in the absence of clear 
congressional prohibition, if the president judges that denying such 
relief might have foreign affairs consequences. This authority has been 
discussed at length as a power inherent in sovereignty existing generally 
in the federal government.8 This analysis fits with the president’s role as 
the United States’ constitutional representative on the international 
scene. Likewise, numerous administrations prior to that of President 
Barack Obama took action on immigration on the president’s own 
accord, with varying levels of input from Congress. Congress’s Article I 
legislative power, however, forbids the president from using his power 
to create substantive immigration laws absent congressional approval. 
Examination of prior executive actions reveals that the president may 
use his foreign affairs power to take ameliorative or lenient action on 
immigration where it advances significant foreign affairs interests for 
the United States, but not where such action would rise to the level of 
being a substantive immigration law. This Note focuses on immigrant-
inclusive executive actions¾actions that operate to keep immigrants in 
the United States¾rather than immigrant-exclusive actions, which 
operate as a bar or restriction on entry. 
I.  IMMIGRATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 
The trajectory of the presidency has been to become more and 
more powerful and imperial in nature.9 Moreover, American politics 
has disintegrated into being as vituperatively partisan as ever.10 
Accordingly, the rule of “the President must act as he sees fit regarding 
	
 8. See generally Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, 
Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. 
REV. 1 (2002) (discussing the historical origins and evolution of the doctrine of inherent powers over 
foreign affairs). 
 9. See William P. Marshall, Eleven Reasons Why Presidential Power Inevitably Expands and 
Why It Matters, 88 B.U. L. REV. 505 (2008). 
 10. This has manifested itself in a number of ways. This hyper-partisan political environment 
has been framed as a danger to world peace (see, for example, Divisive Political Rhetoric a Danger 
to the World, Amnesty Says, BBC NEWS (Feb. 22, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/news/ 
world-39048293); as affecting day-to-day economics (see, for example, Jonathan Bacon, How 
Brands Are Responding to the Divisive Politics of 2016, MARKETING WK. (Dec. 2, 2016, 3:12 PM), 
https://www.marketingweek.com/2016/12/02/brands-dragged-divisive-politics-2016/); and as 
affecting interpersonal stability (see, for example, Jason Silverstein, Woman Claims Her Marriage 
of 22 Years Ended over Husband’s Donald Trump Vote, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 7, 2017, 12:51 PM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/couple-22-years-divorcing-trump-vote-article-
1.2966332). 
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foreign affairs” will no longer hold.11 The current seesaw in immigration 
policy from administration to administration begs for the establishment 
of boundaries regarding immigration law and policy, particularly since 
the long-standing congressional gridlock on the issue12 means that the 
electorate¾as it did in the 2016 election¾will look to the president as 
the source of action on immigration. This occurred when the Obama 
administration formulated DACA and DAPA, to the applause of the 
political Left and the condemnation of the political Right.13 This again 
occurred when President Trump signed his first “travel ban” executive 
order in January 2017, to the applause of the Right and the 
condemnation of the Left.14 
A new way of conceptualizing the President’s immigration power is 
necessary as long as: (1) immigration law remains an area where the 
executive has considerable enforcement discretion; (2) Congress cannot 
agree upon immigration reform; and (3) existing procedures across 
administrations do little to improve the welfare of undocumented 
immigrants. Furthermore, a foreign affairs theory of immigration 
¾foreign affairs power being an area comprising considerable case law 
and preexisting theory¾solves the issue of immigration law being so 
unlike many other areas of law. The government cannot treat citizens 
the way it treats immigrants, whether documented or not. For example, 
upon commission or conviction of a relatively minor legal violation, a 
citizen cannot be hauled before an administrative proceeding to be 
removed to a country he has not seen in decades.15 The difference 
between immigration law and other substantive areas of law is relatively  
under-theorized. Finding a new solution that steers clear of value 
	
 11. Cf. Marshall, supra note 9, at 522 (“After all, one does not have to be an originalist to accept 
the proposition that the Framers, having just gone through a revolutionary war to depose a monarch, 
did not create a constitution that, in the name of national security or foreign affairs, would vest 
unchecked power in the hands of a single individual.”). 
 12. See, e.g., David Nakamura, For More than 25 Years, It’s Never Been the Right Time for 
Immigration Reform, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 
for-more-than-25-years-its-never-been-the-right-time-for-immigration-reform/2014/02/15/ 
90a4ff08-93f9-11e3-84e1-27626c5ef5fb_story.html?utm_term=.0e405b48df3d. 
 13. In the United States since the late twentieth century, the Democratic Party has filled the role 
of the mainstream left, and the Republican Party has filled the role of the mainstream right. 
 14. Compare Michael A. Memoli, House Passes GOP-Backed Bill Aimed at Obama’s ‘Imperial 
Presidency’, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 12, 2014, 6:20 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ 
la-pn-house-imperial-presidency-bills-20140312-story.html (regarding the Obama administration), 
with Carrie Napoleon, Protesters rally in opposition to immigration policy changes, CHI. TRIB.: 
POST-TRIBUNE (Feb. 4, 2017, 5:41 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/suburbs/ 
post-tribune/news/ct-ptb-east-chicago-demonstrate-st-0205-20170204-story.html (regarding the 
Trump Administration). 
 15. See, e.g., Kate Morrissey, Deportation of Grandmother Leaves a San Diego Military Family 
Reeling, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2017, 8:30 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/ 
la-me-grandmother-deportation-20170304-story.html (discussing the deportation of a woman who 
was made an “enforcement priority” because of her lying on government paperwork ten years prior). 
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judgments¾“criminals plotting terror attacks” and “huddled masses” 
alike¾and instead looks at immigration law as being a constitutional 
issue involving foreign affairs could wipe the muddled, punditry-laden 
slate clean.  
As of this writing, the number of undocumented immigrants living 
in the United States is estimated at around 11 million.16 Undocumented 
immigration poses unique issues for governmental and economic 
systems. Although undocumented immigrants are formally removable, 
there are far too many to find and deport in one stroke, especially given 
that the Supreme Court has long held that undocumented immigrants 
possess constitutional rights of due process17 and equal protection of the 
laws.18 Furthermore, the deportation of undocumented immigrants 
cannot be undertaken without foreseeing a considerable blow to 
American business, where undocumented immigrants constitute  
26 percent of the agricultural workforce and seventeen percent of the 
cleaning and maintenance workforce.19 
The United States Constitution gives Congress the power to 
“establish a[ ] uniform Rule of Naturalization.”20 Known as the 
Naturalization Clause, the Supreme Court has interpreted this language, 
when read parallel to the Necessary and Proper Clause, to give Congress 
“considerable power over aliens” beyond solely naturalization.21 
Congress has acted upon this power with considerable magnitude. 
Federal laws governing immigration and naturalization are codified at 
Title 8 of the United States Code.22 These laws cover the minutiae of the 
	
 16. See, e.g., BRYAN BAKER & NANCY RYTINA, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OFF. OF IMMIGRATION 
STATS., ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: 
JANUARY 2012 (2013), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Unauthorized%20 
Immigrant%20Population%20Estimates%20in%20the%20US%20January%202012_0.pdf 
(estimating the number at 11.4 million); JEFFREY S. PASSEL ET AL., PEW RES. CTR., AS GROWTH STALLS, 
UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION BECOMES MORE SETTLED (2014), http://www.pew 
hispanic.org/files/2014/09/2014-09-03_Unauthorized-Final.pdf (estimating the number at 11.3 
million); Caitlin Dickerson & Jennifer Medina, California Farmers Backed Trump, but Now Fear 
Losing Field Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/09/ 
us/california-farmers-backed-trump-but-now-fear-losing-field-workers.html (discussing the impact 
that mass deportations would have on California’s agricultural economy). 
 17. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896). 
 18. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 212 (1982). 
 19. Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, Share of Unauthorized Immigrant Workers in Production, 
Construction Jobs Falls Since 2007, PEW RES. CTR. (Mar. 26, 2015), http://www.pewhispanic.org/ 
2015/03/26/share-of-unauthorized-immigrant-workers-in-production-construction-jobs-falls-since 
-2007/. 
 20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 21. Chadha v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 634 F.2d 408, 418 (9th Cir. 1980), aff’d, 
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). See generally U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 18 (“[Congress shall have power to] make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers . . .”). 
 22. For illustrative provisions codified in Title 8, see infra notes 23–26. 
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immigrant experience in the United States, from immigration,23 to 
naturalization and removal,24 to refugee assistance,25 to restriction of 
public benefits.26 
However, as a matter of course, Congress cannot enforce the 
immigration laws it makes. That duty must be left to the president, 
acting largely through the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). 
The Constitution vests all executive power in the president,27 stating 
that the president “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.”28 The Take Care Clause acts as a congressional check on the 
president, prohibiting him from suspending laws he finds objectionable 
or inapposite to his policy goals.29 A certain amount of enforcement or 
“prosecutorial” discretion is necessary nonetheless, for three reasons. 
The first is a holistic type of fairness. To-the-letter enforcement of 
federal law¾or any law¾regardless of a person’s good-faith mistake or 
other lack of a culpable activity does little to further the ends of justice. 
The second reason is efficiency. The sheer volume of federal laws and 
regulations that a comparatively small federal government is tasked 
with enforcing means that rigorous enforcement of federal law would 
place too great of a strain on the system.30 Third, the president has the 
independent power to judge a law’s constitutionality, and may decline 
enforcement on constitutional grounds.31 
The first two factors were at play when, in 2012, under the 
direction of the Obama Administration, DHS announced DACA, a 
policy of prosecutorial discretion for undocumented immigrants who 
came to the United States as children. Fairness was a major 
consideration behind DACA, as it applied to “certain young people who 
were brought to this country as children[,] . . . know only this country as 
home . . . [, and] lack[ ] the intent to violate the law . . . .”32 
	
 23. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151–1381 (2012). 
 24. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1421–1459 (2012). 
 25. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1521–1524 (2012). 
 26. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1646 (2012). 
 27. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the 
United States of America.”). 
 28. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. This provision is commonly called the Take Care Clause. 
 29. For a detailed analysis of the Take Care Clause and its interplay with enforcement 
discretion, see Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV.  
671, 690 (2014). 
 30. See id. at 676. 
 31. This theory, called “departmentalism,” holds that each branch of the government is an 
adequate judge of the constitutionality of its own acts and those of the other branches. The tenth 
edition of Black’s Law Dictionary characterizes it as “prominent in the decades shortly after 
ratification,” but mostly giving way to judicial supremacy afterward. Departmentalism, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). But see United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2685 (2013) 
(regarding the executive’s declining to defend the Defense of Marriage Act in the Windsor litigation, 
which might be viewed as a modern articulation of departmentalism). 
 32. DACA MEMORANDUM, supra note 2, at 1. 
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Furthermore, DACA attempted to incorporate administrative efficiency 
considerations, to ensure that “enforcement resources are not expended 
on these low priority cases but are instead appropriately focused on 
people who meet our enforcement priorities.”33 Procedurally, DACA 
offered a non-binding, two-year, renewable guarantee that removal 
proceedings would not be initiated against applicants who met the 
following criteria: 
1. Arrival in the United States under the age of sixteen; 
2. Residence in the United States for at least five years prior to 2012 
and at the time the policy was initiated; 
3. Education or military service requirements; 
4. No felony or significant misdemeanor convictions; 
5. Under the age of thirty; and 
6. Successful completion of a background check.34 
Two years later, the DHS expanded DACA to remove the age cap 
and initiated a similar policy for people who are undocumented 
immigrants but have citizen or lawful permanent resident children, 
subject to similar conditions as DACA.35 This expanded program was 
known as DAPA. 
II.  OBJECTIONS TO DACA AND DAPA 
Both DACA and DAPA have seen a number of challenges in 
Congress and in the judiciary. Among the most vehement objections to 
DACA and DAPA arose from both houses of Congress. 2014 marked the 
first election in eight years in which the Republican Party gained a 
majority of both the Senate and House of Representatives, creating a 
forceful opposition against the Democratic Party that controlled the 
White House.36 As a result, a vigorous dispute ensued in the legislative 
branch about the constitutionality of the deferred action policies. This 
was in addition to the litigation that the policies had already generated 
in the judicial branch. 
On June 15, 2017, President Trump’s then-Secretary of Homeland 
Security, John F. Kelly, issued a formal rescission of DAPA, thereby 
mooting the qualms related to that policy.37 This action specifically left 
	
 33. Id. 
 34. For all of these elements, see id.  
 35. DAPA MEMORANDUM, supra note 3. 
 36. Compare FED. ELECTION COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2014: ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE U.S. SENATE 
& THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (2015), with FED. ELECTION COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2006: 
ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE U.S. SENATE & THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (2007). 
 37. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., RESCISSION OF NOVEMBER 20, 2014 MEMORANDUM PROVIDING FOR 
DEFERRED ACTION FOR PARENTS OF AMERICANS AND LAWFUL PERMANENT RESIDENTS (“DAPA”) (2017), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/DAPA%20Cancellation%20Memo.pdf 
[hereinafter DAPA RESCISSION MEMORANDUM]. 
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in place DACA.38 This came as a shock to many, since President Trump 
had stated that he would rescind DACA while on the campaign trail in 
2015 and 2016.39 A rescission of DACA came not long after, on 
September 5, 2017.40 The DHS’s memorandum rescinding DACA¾after 
fleetingly casting doubts on the policy’s constitutionality41¾indicated 
that deferred action status would not be terminated immediately, but 
would be adjudicated afterward on a case-by-case basis where still 
applicable.42 Given that this launched litigation not only by individual 
DACA beneficiaries, but also by sixteen state attorneys-general, the 
fight over DACA’s constitutionality seems likely to persist for some time 
after the ink was spilled rescinding the program.43 
A. CONGRESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL REACTIONS TO DEFERRED  
ACTION POLICIES 
Congressional hearings shortly after the 2014 election cycle 
contested the constitutionality of the policies. In the House Judiciary 
Committee’s hearing on DACA and DAPA, Congressman Bob Goodlatte, 
a Virginia Republican and the chair of the committee, derided the 
policies as a usurpation of Congress’s legislative authority and an 
abdication of the president’s law enforcement duty.44 Characterizing 
DACA and DAPA as “one of the biggest constitutional power grabs ever 
by a President,” Congressman Goodlatte viewed the policies as allowing 
undocumented immigrants a plethora of benefits, including work 
authorization, social security, and tax benefits.45 One of the hearing’s 
	
 38. Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Rescission of Memorandum Providing for Deferred 
Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents (“DAPA”) (June 15, 2017), 
https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/06/15/rescission-memorandum-providing-deferred-action-
parents-americans-and-lawful (“The June 15, 2012 memorandum that created the Deferred Action 
for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program will remain in effect.”). 
 39. See, e.g., Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast, Aug. 16, 2015) (“The executive order 
gets rescinded . . . . We have to make a whole new set of standards,” said President Trump regarding 
the Obama-era immigration actions, including DACA.). 
 40. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., MEMORANDUM ON RESCISSION OF DEFERRED ACTION FOR 
CHILDHOOD ARRIVALS (“DACA”) (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/09/05/ 
memorandum-rescission-daca.  
 41. The day before DACA’s rescission, the U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions sent a letter to the 
DHS indicating his opinion that “DACA was effectuated by the previous administration through . . . 
an open-ended circumvention of immigration laws [and] was an unconstitutional exercise of 
authority by the Executive Branch.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
 42. Id. 
 43. See Second Amended Complaint at *34–35, Vidal v. Duke, No. 1:16-cv-04756 (NCG) (JO) 
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2017) (challenging DACA’s rescission, filed by DACA recipients); Complaint for 
Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at *55, New York v. Trump, No. 17-cv-5228 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2017). 
 44. Unconstitutionality of Obama’s Executive Actions on Immigration: H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 114th Cong. 1–3 (2015) (opening statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte, Chairman of the House 
Committee on the Judiciary) [hereinafter House Deferred Action Hearing]. 
 45. Id. at 1. 
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witnesses, Nevada Attorney General Adam Paul Laxalt, advanced a legal 
argument against deferred action, namely that the policies violated the 
Take Care Clause and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).46 
Congresswoman Zoe Lofgren, a California Democrat, raised a political 
defense and argued that DACA and DAPA function as a means of 
effecting change on immigration policy in view of partisan-motivated 
government shutdowns and obstructionism.47 
The Senate Judiciary Committee’s hearing, pressingly (if 
melodramatically) entitled Declining Deportations and Increasing 
Criminal Alien Releases¾The Lawless Immigration Policies of the 
Obama Administration, featured testimony from a number of 
immigration experts and political theorists. One such witness, Mark 
Krikorian of the conservative-leaning Center for Immigration Studies, 
stated that the deferred action policies were not “true” prosecutorial 
discretion, which he defined as actions by “individual law enforcement 
officers in ways that do not undermine the agency’s mission.”48 Rather, 
Krikorian described the deferred action policies as being a “pretext for 
exempting the vast majority of immigration violators from any 
possibility of legal consequences.”49 
The judiciary has been no friend to the deferred action policies, 
despite not tackling the issue head-on. One case in the federal appeals 
court for the D.C. Circuit, Arpaio v. Obama, rejected a claim against the 
policies due to lack of the plaintiffs’ standing,50 despite one concurring 
judge calling the policies “problematic.”51 The Fifth Circuit, in Texas v. 
United States, affirmed a preliminary injunction that halted the 
implementation of DAPA.52 An evenly divided Supreme Court, in the 
wake of Justice Antonin Scalia’s death, affirmed the Fifth Circuit in a 
one-line per curiam opinion.53 Although the underlying claims in Texas 
v. United States were that DAPA violated rulemaking procedures and 
abrogated the President’s law execution duty, the Fifth Circuit did not 
address the merits of the claims.54 
	
 46. Id. at 11. 
 47. Id. (statement of Rep. Zoe Lofgren, Ranking Member of the House Judiciary Subcommittee 
on Immigration and Border Security). 
 48. Declining Deportations and Increasing Criminal Alien Releases¾The Lawless 
Immigration Policies of the Obama Administration: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration 
and the Nat’l Interest of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. 1 (2016) (statement of Mark 
Krikorian, Exec. Dir. of the Ctr. for Immigration Studies) [hereinafter Senate Deferred Action 
Hearing]. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2015). 
 51. Id. (Brown, J., concurring). 
 52. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 150 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 53. United States v. Texas, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016). It is worth noting, however, that the 
Supreme Court’s affirmance cannot be viewed as establishing any kind of binding precedent. 
 54. See Texas, 809 F.3d at 146. 
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B. THE MISSING FOREIGN AFFAIRS PUZZLE PIECE 
Two notable themes in the above challenges to the deferred action 
policies exist. One is that DACA and DAPA violate the rulemaking 
procedures and requirements under the APA.55 The APA sets forth 
notice and public comment requirements before a federal agency can 
make a new rule.56 It also allows a court to set aside agency rules that 
exceed the agency’s statutory authority, or if the rules are 
unconstitutional.57 Opponents of the policies argue that since DACA 
and DAPA are the “rules” of an administrative agency (here, DHS), and 
because they did not go through the APA-mandated processes, they 
must be set aside. The opaque nature of agency rulemaking doctrine 
tends to confuse the constitutional issue around these policies. 
Moreover, at least one set of scholars believes a challenge to DACA and 
DAPA on rulemaking grounds would not likely prevail.58 Therefore, this 
Note assumes arguendo that there is no rulemaking issue with these 
policies. 
The other theme is that the policies are flatly unconstitutional, 
owing to Congress’s Article I authority and the president’s Take Care 
Clause duty. However, many of these objections are based upon a 
traditional understanding of constitutional jurisprudence, under the 
assumption that immigration law is treated the same from a 
constitutional point of view as, for example, criminal law and civil 
actions. A principle of “immigration exceptionalism”¾that is, a 
departure from “mainstream constitutional norms”59¾marks American 
immigration jurisprudence. A large part of this theory derives from the 
plenary power doctrine in immigration case law, which states that the 
federal government has plenary power over immigrants as an essential 
attribute of sovereignty.60 
This plenary power is aligned with and derives from the plenary 
power over foreign affairs that the federal government has¾specifically, 
the president¾as discussed in Part III.B. Truly, this exercise of power is 
exceptional, resulting in “a regulatory regime that . . . ‘would be 
	
 55. The DHS, which formally propagated the policies, is considered an “agency” under the APA. 
See 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2012). 
 56. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
 57. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012). 
 58. See Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodríguez, The President and Immigration Law Redux,  
125 YALE L.J. 104, 216 n.313 (2015) (doubting that a court could consider DACA and DAPA as 
“legislative rules”). 
 59. David S. Rubenstein & Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Immigration Exceptionalism, 111 NW. U. 
L. REV. 583, 584 (2017). 
 60. See id. at 596; accord Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (quoting Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 
345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953)) (recognizing that power to exclude immigrants is a “fundamental 
sovereign attribute”). 
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unacceptable if applied to citizens.’”61 Ordinarily, mainstream 
constitutional theory as it applies to citizens does not quite work when 
considering immigration law, and so much of the jurisprudence 
surrounding the federal government’s interaction with immigrants is 
rooted in its power to conduct international affairs. It follows that 
immigration law and foreign affairs power should be discussed in 
tandem. 
III.  HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER 
Article II of the U.S. Constitution alludes to indicia of the 
president’s foreign affairs power.62 Some of these powers are vested in 
the president alone, such as the power to be “Commander in Chief of 
the Army and Navy of the United States,”63 and the power to “receive 
Ambassadors and other public Ministers.”64 Other foreign affairs 
powers occur only with Senate agreement, such as the power to appoint 
ambassadors “by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,” and 
the power to make treaties “provided two thirds of the Senators present 
concur.”65 This is the extent of where the Constitution speaks on 
executive power over foreign affairs. 
A. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EXECUTIVE FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER 
It would be misleading to state that the federal government only 
possesses foreign affairs power through constitutional fiat. The federal 
government has power over foreign affairs simply by virtue of its status 
as a sovereign nation.66 Since the states cannot, for example, enter into 
agreements themselves with foreign nations, it follows that the states 
lack this foreign affairs power.67 According to Professor Sarah H. 
Cleveland, foreign affairs power is not “derived from, nor substantially 
limited by, the Constitution” and is largely insulated from judicial 
review because it is a power inherent in sovereignty.68 
Building on this “inherence” theory, immigration is part of this 
foreign affairs power. The immigration of foreigners to the United 
	
 61. Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 59, at 596 (quoting Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S.  
67, 80 (1967)). 
 62. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2–3. 
 63. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 64. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 65. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 66. See Cleveland, supra note 8, at 7; cf. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 
537, 542 (1950) (“The exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of sovereignty. The right to do so 
stems not alone from legislative power but is inherent in the executive power to control the foreign 
affairs of the nation.”). 
 67. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or 
Confederation.”). 
 68. Cleveland, supra note 8, at 8. 
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States was very much on the minds of the Framers. Indeed, one of the 
grievances that the founding generation had against Great Britain 
before the Revolution was that “the King had obstructed free 
immigration to the colonies,” and furthermore, “at the time of the 
framing, the United States generally encouraged free immigration, 
while various states maintained laws authorizing the expulsion of aliens 
deemed undesirable.”69 Notably, the Constitution’s Naturalization 
Clause took this power away from the states, and most courts today look 
with disfavor on allowing the states to remove immigrants themselves.70 
Moreover, as the United States’ federal system matured throughout the 
nineteenth century, numerous scholars of that era found a nation’s right 
to control who may enter its borders to be a foundational principle of 
international law, without weighing the Constitution into the calculus.71 
It would be inadvisable to use the “inherence” analysis to 
supersede the constitutional text entirely. The rule of law in the United 
States¾in its most general terms¾requires governmental acts to flow 
from constitutional authority and to be subject to judicial review, within 
reason.72 However, the “inherence” principle provides cohesion for the 
Constitution’s piecemeal approach to executive foreign affairs powers. 
Led by the “inherence” theory, a major constitutional principle becomes 
apparent: the Naturalization Clause operates not so much to make 
immigration and naturalization the exclusive province of Congress, but 
rather to make them the exclusive province of the federal government. 
This is a reaction to the pre-Framing removal authority that the states 
understood themselves to possess.73 It should not be interpreted as 
	
 69. Id. at 81. For a prime example of the founding generation’s immigration grievance against 
Great Britain, see also THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776): “He [i.e., King George III of 
Great Britain] has endeavoured to prevent the Population of these States; for that Purpose 
obstructing the Laws for Naturalization of Foreigners; [and] refusing to pass others to encourage 
their Migrations hither.” 
 70. Recently, courts have applied this rule to strike down state and local laws against 
undocumented immigrants on the grounds that those laws act as a usurpation of the federal 
authority on immigration. See, e.g., Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012); Villas at 
Parkside Partners v. City of Farmers Branch, 726 F.3d 524 (5th Cir. 2013); Lozano v. City of 
Hazleton, 724 F.3d 297 (3d Cir. 2013). Contra Keller v. City of Fremont, 719 F.3d 931 (8th Cir. 2013) 
(holding anomalously that a city ordinance forbidding undocumented immigrants from holding 
rental occupancy licenses was not an impermissible regulation of immigration, the direct opposite of 
the Villas at Parkside Partners holding above). 
 71. See Cleveland, supra note 8, at 85–86. 
 72. I say “within reason” purposefully here, as some acts cannot be open to judicial review, such 
as those that are considered chiefly political questions. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 73. See Cleveland, supra note 8, at 81. The records of the 1787 Constitutional Convention 
likewise indicate a desire to take naturalization power away from the states and place it in the hands 
of the federal government. See, e.g., 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 245 (Max 
Farrand ed., 1911) (“Res[olve]d. the rule for naturalization ought to be the same in every State”). 
Indeed, the federal supremacy of varied aspects of immigration law, and not just the naturalization 
mentioned in the Naturalization Clause, figured quite early in United States immigration 
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shearing the president of all authority to act on immigration by himself, 
rather than acting as Congress’s loyal factotum, as many commentators 
have alluded he should.74 
B. HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EXECUTIVE FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER 
Support for the executive’s possession of plenary power over 
foreign affairs arises both in writings near in time to the Framing as 
well as in later case law interpreting the Constitution. The 
Constitution’s approach to foreign affairs power is markedly different 
from that of the Articles of Confederation, which required the consent 
of “the United States in Congress assembled” in order to conduct 
diplomatic acts.75 Almost half a century after the Constitution’s drafting, 
Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story argued in favor of the 
Constitution’s pivot away from the Articles of Confederation’s approach 
to foreign affairs. To Justice Story, certain diplomatic functions, such as 
receiving ambassadors in particular, must be left to the executive 
alone.76 Accordingly, the Constitution’s delegation of these powers to 
the executive accounted for three considerations: first, that foreign 
governments had vested this power in their executive as well; second, 
that it would be too onerous to keep the Senate (for example) in 
constant session to allow for potential international emergencies if the 
Senate were to exercise that power; and third, that the President was 
unlikely to abuse the power.77 
In constitutional jurisprudence on foreign affairs power, a leading 
decision (and incidentally one which largely bolsters the “inherence” 
theory) is the Supreme Court’s landmark opinion in United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. Curtiss-Wright¾an aircraft manufacturer 
and defense contractor¾was charged with selling arms and munitions 
to the South American belligerents in the Chaco War, in violation of a 
	
jurisprudence. See generally The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849) (striking down state 
laws that levied a per-head tax on foreign nationals arriving in the states’ ports). 
 74. For a representative example of this view, see Guillermo I. Martinez, True Immigration 
Reform Should Not Be Done by Executive Order, SUN-SENTINEL (July 29, 2015), http:// 
www.sun-sentinel.com/opinion/fl-gmcol-oped0730-20150729-column.html. 
 75. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. VI, para. 1 (“No State, without the consent of the 
united States, in Congress assembled, shall send any embassy to, or receive any embassy from, or 
enter into any conference, agreement, alliance or treaty with any King, Prince or State.”). 
 76. See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,  
§§ 1565–1569 (2d ed. 1851). 
 77. See id. § 1561. It is worth remembering that Justice Story was writing in the midst of the 
golden age of imperialism, when the United States maintained diplomatic relations with a small 
fraction of the nations that it currently does. This was largely because the vast empires of the United 
Kingdom, Spain, the Ottomans, and France, as well as the lack of connections to many Asian and 
African countries, made the possibility foreign relations with hundreds of competing nations a 
nullity. His assertion that reception of ambassadors had a low potential for abuse might seem quaint 
in view of twenty-first century international relations. 
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congressional resolution and presidential proclamation.78 The issue in 
the case was whether Congress had improperly delegated to the 
president the power to prevent the arms sales.79 The Court held that 
there was no such improper delegation, because “[t]he President is the 
constitutional representative of the United States with regard to foreign 
nations.”80 This is so because, since before the Revolution, the 
individual states never had international relations powers: The power of 
“external sovereignty” passed from the British Crown to the new United 
States government, first to the Continental Congress,81 and eventually 
to the executive once the Constitution created that office.82 Applying the 
“inherence” principle, the Court stated: 
[T]he very delicate, plenary and exclusive power [is held by] the 
President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of 
international relations¾a power which does not require as a basis for 
its exercise an act of Congress, but which, of course, like every other 
governmental power, must be exercised in subordination to the 
applicable provisions of the Constitution.83 
This holding strikingly contemplates constitutional boundaries to 
the powers. The essential principle here is that the president has the 
power to conduct foreign affairs, and those powers are plenary. In other 
words, the president’s foreign affairs powers are wide-ranging, 
requiring no delegation from Congress and minimal oversight from that 
body. 
Fourteen years later, the Supreme Court explicitly upheld executive 
action on immigration as an indicium of the sovereign’s foreign affairs 
power in United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy.84 Knauff 
pertained to a German national who was denied entry into the United 
States upon confidential evidence and without a hearing, 
notwithstanding her marriage to a U.S. citizen.85 Justice Minton wrote 
for a four-person majority, with two justices recused and three 
dissenting. Citing to Curtiss-Wright, inter alia, as authority, the Court 
stated: 
 
 
 
 
	
 78. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 311 (1936). 
 79. See id. at 314–15. 
 80. Id. at 319 (quoting U.S. Senate, Reports, Committee on Foreign Relations, vol. 8, p. 24). 
 81. Id. at 316–17. 
 82. Id. at 316. 
 83. Id. at 320. 
 84. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950). 
 85. See id. at 539–40. 
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[T]here is no question of inappropriate delegation of legislative power 
involved here. The exclusion of aliens is a fundamental act of 
sovereignty. The right to do so stems not alone from legislative power 
but is inherent in the executive power to control the foreign affairs of 
the nation . . . . When Congress prescribes a procedure concerning the 
admissibility of aliens, it is not dealing alone with a legislative power. 
It is implementing an inherent executive power.86 
The foreign national wife was thus barred from entering the United 
States.87 Knauff signals the acceptance of the plenary power doctrine as 
it pertains to immigration.88 
C. PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND CONGRESSIONAL POWER 
One problem with applying the plenary power theory to executive 
actions on immigration is particularly glaring. Congress has Article I 
power over immigration through the Naturalization Clause.89 The 
distribution of power here must, in some form, respect Congress’s 
legislative authority over immigration. Although the Naturalization 
Clause firmly plants the power over immigration and naturalization in 
the realm of the federal government, the constitutional text is 
insurmountable: the power is conferred upon Congress, not the 
president. The constitutional text, as interpreted over time by courts, 
gives Congress the power to create substantive immigration laws, the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) and its various amendments 
being exemplary.90 Notably, the INA respects the president’s plenary 
power, especially at sections 212(f),91 214(a)(1),92 and 215(a)(1),93 where 
	
 86. Id. at 542; see also Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953). 
 87. Knauff, 338 U.S. at 547. 
 88. See, e.g., Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422, 443 (3d Cir. 2016) (“Thus, 
Knauff and Mezei essentially restored the political branches’ plenary power over aliens at the border 
seeking admission. And since these decisions, the Court has continued to signal its commitment to 
the full breadth of the plenary power doctrine, at least as to aliens at the border seeking admission to 
the country.”). 
 89. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 90. The Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) as first enacted in 1952 overhauled the United 
States legislative schema on immigration, while still keeping in place various restrictive elements like 
nationality quotas and prohibitions against people with certain political views. See generally INA of 
1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952). Subsequent amendments to the INA of 1952 loosened 
several of the original restrictions, although United States immigration law still retains many 
vestiges of the old systems. See generally Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (Hart-Celler Act), 
Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965) (abolishing the quota system based on national origin); 
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (providing for family-based 
immigration visas and the Diversity Immigrant Visa program, as well as the Temporary Protected 
Status visa for immigrants from countries experiencing armed or environmental upheaval). But see 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L. No.  
104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (allowing, inter alia, immigrants who had committed minor criminal 
offenses to be eligible for deportation). 
 91. See infra Part V.A.  
 92. INA § 214(a)(1) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1184(a)(1) (2012)) (allowing admission of 
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it treats the presidential authority as being one of regulation and 
discretion. 
On the other hand, the president himself does have substantive 
foreign affairs power. The Supreme Court recognized this in Dames & 
Moore v. Regan, which contemplated whether an executive order’s 
suspension of all claims against Iran brought before a claims tribunal 
¾a reaction to the 1979 Iran hostage crisis¾was a constitutional 
invocation of executive power.94 In light of “the character of the 
legislation Congress has enacted in the area” and “the history of 
[congressional] acquiescence in executive claims settlement,” the Court 
held that it was constitutional.95 This holding was based in part on 
Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown 
Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, where the validity of the president’s 
action, when the president and Congress have concurrent authority, 
must be viewed in light of “congressional inertia, indifference or 
quiescence.”96 Accordingly, an evaluation of the whole character of the 
President’s actions regarding foreign affairs¾and Congress’s 
interaction with the subject¾is in order to determine the 
constitutionality of the President’s actions in that sphere. 
In sum, the president has no power to create substantive 
immigration laws by himself and of his own prerogative. There is, 
however, a foreign affairs nexus that allows for a measure of 
independent presidential authority: immigrants remain citizens or 
subjects of a foreign sovereign until naturalized, therefore “[a]n 
Englishman who removes to France, or to China, owes the same 
allegiance to the king of England there as at home, and twenty years 
hence as well as now.”97 Just as the Supreme Court concluded in Dames 
& Moore regarding presidential authority to act on foreign affairs 
matters independently, finding the president’s independent authority 
on immigrant-inclusive actions as an exercise of foreign affairs power 
requires examining the existing legislative scheme and the history of 
Congress’s action, inaction, or acquiescence in similar matters.98 In 
terms of the preexisting legislative scheme, the provisions of the INA 
	
nonimmigrant aliens “for such time and under such conditions as the Attorney General may by 
regulations prescribe”). 
 93. Id. § 215(a)(1) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1185(a)(1) (2012)) (“Unless otherwise ordered by the 
President, it shall be unlawful¾(a) for any alien to depart from or enter . . . the United States except 
under such reasonable rules, regulations, and orders, and subject to such limitations and exceptions 
as the President may prescribe.”). 
 94. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 660–62 (1981). 
 95. Id. at 686. 
 96. Id. at 668–69 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring)). 
 97. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *357–58 (1765). 
 98. See Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 686. 
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cited above afford the president considerable discretion in many actions 
on immigration.99 An examination of prior executive actions on 
immigration¾and congressional interaction with them¾proves helpful 
in determining the shape of this presidential authority and the 
situations in which it may be exercised. 
IV.  CONTEMPLATING PRIOR EXECUTIVE ACTIONS ON IMMIGRATION 
Presidents generally abide by the traditions of their predecessors, 
and breaks from those traditions are significant when they occur. 
However, there is no formal presidential equivalent of stare decisis. 
Presidents are not legally bound by the actions of prior presidents in the 
same way that judges are by prior opinions.100 In this way, referring to 
past presidents’ actions on immigration to support the reasoning in the 
sections above are all varieties of the “appeal to tradition” fallacy. 
However, the brevity of Article II, coupled with the current 
complexities of the executive branch, mean that a number of executive 
functions are necessarily established by tradition or other  
extra-constitutional authorities that have the force of law. Most 
noteworthy, the power to issue executive orders has no explicit 
constitutional foundation. Likewise, the specific procedures of 
senatorial advice and consent are without express constitutional basis, 
other than a general provision allowing the congressional bodies to 
“determine the Rules of [their] Proceedings.”101 The point here is that 
while presidents might not necessarily be legally bound by the actions 
of their predecessors, time, tradition, and procedural rules create a 
quasi-legal precedent by which presidents should abide.102 
Accordingly, evaluating prior executive actions on immigration can 
be useful in determining how past presidents have implicitly invoked a 
foreign affairs rationale in taking those actions. The following analysis 
will focus on executive actions that kept foreign nationals in the 
country, rather than excluding them. These situations will be the most 
	
 99. Especially of note here is the provision allowing “admission to the United States of 
[nonimmigrant] alien[s] . . . for such time and under such conditions as the Attorney General 
may . . . prescribe . . . .” INA § 214(a)(1) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1184(a)(1)). 
 100. See Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 58, at 114 (declining to treat actions by other 
administrations as “quasi-legal precedent”). 
 101. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. Rule XXXI of the Standing Rules of the United States Senate, for 
example, governs how confirmation hearings are to be conducted in a manner that provides the 
Senate’s advice and consent for presidential nominees. See U.S. SENATE COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., 
U.S. SENATE MANUAL, S. DOC. NO. 113-1, Rule XXXI, at 58–59 (2014). It is important to note that the 
rules in the Senate Manual are parliamentary procedures, not laws, and thus do not go through the 
usual bicameralism and presentment procedures prescribed for laws by Article I, Section 7 of the 
Constitution. 
 102. William P. Marshall also contemplates that previous presidents’ usage of power created 
room for subsequent presidents’ usage of that same power, allowing for an inevitable “one-way 
ratchet” in increasing the presidency’s power. Marshall, supra note 9, at 511. 
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help in determining the permissibility of policies such as DACA and 
DAPA. Three twentieth century examples most pointedly implicate 
executive foreign affairs powers being exercised in an immigrant-
inclusive context, and take place over both Democratic and Republican 
administrations and Congresses: the bracero program, which started in 
the 1940s, slightly over 900 “foreign-born orphans” adopted by U.S. 
citizen parents in 1956, and the program for Chinese students 
implicated in the Tiananmen Square protests in the 1980s. 
A. THE BRACERO PROGRAM 
The bracero program operated in the United States from 1942 to 
1964103 and was initiated through a bilateral international agreement. 
This invoked the executive’s foreign affairs power, and wavered in 
Congressional support throughout the program’s lifetime. It is 
substantially different from the other examples below in that it was not 
solely a reaction to a specific event of limited duration. The genesis of 
the bracero program was a shortage of farm labor as a result of World 
War II,104 but the entire program lasted for a generation beyond that. 
The program allowed contract farm laborers to come to the United 
States from Mexico, initially guaranteeing them thirty cents per hour,105 
subject to various guarantees of working conditions and subsistence 
wages in case of unemployment.106 Although twenty-four states availed 
themselves of the program,107 it was not universally popular. 
Contemporary economic reviews found that the program depressed the 
wages of the United States’ own farm laborers,108 in addition to a 
common view that the program was a type of wage-slavery.109 
	
 103. “Manual laborer,” from Spanish brazo, “arm.” KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE¾THE 
BRACERO PROGRAM, IMMIGRATION, AND THE I.N.S. 1 (1992). 
 104. E.g., id. at 19. 
 105. $4.46 per hour in 2017 dollars. CPI Inflation Calculator, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR BUREAU OF 
LABOR STATISTICS, https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2017) 
(adjusting for inflation between August 1942 and August 2017). 
 106. Agreement for the Migration of Mexican Agricultural Workers, Mex.-U.S., Aug. 4, 1942, 56 
Stat. 1759, 1767–68 (“Wages and Employment” section of the international agreement establishing 
the program). 
 107. E.g., CALAVITA, supra note 103, at 21. 
 108. U.C. Davis Dep’t of Agric. Econ., The Bracero Program, RURAL MIGRATION NEWS, Vol. 9,  
No. 2 (Apr. 2003), https://migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/more.php?id=10. 
 109. For example, Tom Lehrer sneered in a 1965 lyric, “And after all, even in Egypt, the 
pharaohs / Had to import Hebrew braceros.” TOM LEHRER, George Murphy, on THAT WAS THE YEAR 
THAT WAS (Reprise Records 1965). A decidedly less tongue-in-cheek view of the bracero program in 
popular culture is Woody Guthrie’s 1948 song “Deportee (Plane Wreck at Los Gatos),” about migrant 
Mexican farmworkers killed in an airplane crash while being deported to Mexico, and the 
contemptuous treatment that they received in the United States previously. WOODY GUTHRIE, 
Deportee (Plane Wreck at Los Gatos), on THE GREATEST SONGS OF WOODY GUTHRIE (Vanguard 1972) 
(written as a poem by Woody Guthrie in 1948, put to music by Martin Hoffman, and performed in 
this album by Cisco Houston). 
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The bracero program has parallels to DACA and DAPA as an 
invocation of executive power for multiple reasons. To begin, it stands 
as “a series of programs initiated by administrative fiat, subsequently 
endorsed by Congress, and kept alive by executive agreement whenever 
foreign relations or domestic politics threatened their demise.”110 The 
program was administered at various points by the Department of 
Agriculture and its divisions, the Farm Security Administration, the 
War Food Administration, the Department of State, the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service (“INS”), and the United States Employment 
Service111¾all part of the Executive Branch. Thus, like DACA and 
DAPA, the bracero program existed as an entity of administrative 
agencies, and not by actual “executive order.” Furthermore, the periods 
in which Congress wavered on its endorsement of the program are 
similar to Congress’s qualms over the validity of the Obama 
Administration’s actions, which stopped short of passing legislation to 
terminate the policies.112 
More relevant to our analysis, there is an implicit executive 
invocation of foreign affairs power underlying the bracero program. 
The program began through a 1942 agreement between the United 
States and Mexico, negotiated between the United States Ambassador 
to Mexico and the Mexican Minister for Foreign Relations.113 A 
supplemental agreement detailing further conditions followed nearly 
nine months later.114 Three days after the second agreement, Congress 
formally endorsed the bracero program in a farm labor appropriation, 
exempting contract agricultural workers from North, South, and Central 
America from head taxes and admission charges, and loosening 
documentation requirements.115 The bracero program endured until 
Congress, by law, decided upon a final termination date of December 
31, 1947.116 This was not the death knell for the program. Another 
international agreement, effected by an exchange between the United 
States Chargé d’Affaires ad interim and the Mexican Secretary for 
Foreign Relations, allowed not only for the program’s continuation, but 
also for new contract workers to arrive from Mexico.117 The agreement 
	
 110. CALAVITA, supra note 103, at 1–2. 
 111. Id. at 20–21. 
 112. See supra Part II.A. 
 113. Agreement for the Migration of Mexican Agricultural Workers, supra note 106. 
 114. Agreement for the Migration of Mexican Agricultural Workers Revising the Agreement of 
Aug. 4, 1942, Mex.-U.S., Apr. 26, 1943, 57 Stat. 1152. 
 115. Act of Apr. 29, 1943, ch. 82, § 5(g); 57 Stat. 70, 73 (providing for the supply and distribution 
of farm labor for 1943). 
 116. Act of Apr. 28, 1947, ch. 43, 61 Stat. 55, 56 (providing for the continuance and liquidation of 
the farm labor supply program). 
 117. Agreement for the Migration of Mexican Agricultural Workers Superceding the Agreement 
Apr. 26, 1943 and May 10, 1947, Mex.-U.S., Feb. 21, 1948, 62 Stat. 3887–89. 
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itself stated that its existence contemplated the prior administrative 
regime’s sunsetting on December 31, 1947, in addition to considering 
“the continued need for additional agricultural workers in certain 
regions of the United States.”118 This agreement continued to govern 
until the passage of Public Law 82-78 in 1951,119 which would be the 
definitive word on the bracero program (with four extensions through 
1959120) for the remainder of its existence. 
The bracero program’s functioning through international 
agreements belies a foreign affairs power consideration that the 
executive branch invoked in the Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. 
Truman Administrations¾both were Democratic presidents navigating 
Democrat- and Republican-controlled Congresses. The agreements 
between the United States and Mexico in 1942, 1943, and 1948 are just 
that¾bilateral agreements between two countries, not treaties that 
required the Senate’s advice and consent in accordance with the 
Constitution. The executive may enter into an international agreement 
on the United States’ behalf when acting pursuant to a preexisting 
treaty, to preexisting legislation, or to inherent executive authority (for 
example, when acting as the United States’ representative in foreign 
affairs, when exercising the nation’s recognition powers, or when acting 
as Commander-in-Chief).121 Likewise, as put by the Curtiss-Wright 
Court, “the power to make such international agreements [that] do not 
constitute treaties in the constitutional sense”122 is one of the main 
areas of sovereign power where, by reason of that case’s holding, the 
president has plenary authority to act on behalf of the nation. 
Accordingly, diplomatic power¾here the power to enter into non-
treaty international agreements¾was invoked to create the bracero 
program, and indeed sustained it when Congress wavered in legislative 
support for it. This is so even when considering the program’s sizeable 
impact on immigration. Indeed, to administer the program more 
effectively in the late 1940s, the INS developed a de facto legalization 
program for undocumented braceros, even legalizing 55,000 
undocumented farmworkers in Texas alone in the summer of 1947.123 
All this occurred in addition to a significant foreign affairs interest that 
the Department of State described immediately postwar: The United 
States’ agreement with Mexico helped to stabilize Mexico against 
	
 118. Id. at 3887. 
 119. Act to amend the Agricultural Act of 1949, ch. 223, 65 Stat. 121. 
 120. CALAVITA, supra note 103, at 45. 
 121. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 11 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL §§ 723.2-2–732.2-2(C) (2006), 
https://fam.state.gov/FAM/11FAM/11FAM0720.html. 
 122. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936). 
 123. CALAVITA, supra note 103, at 24. Professor Calavita expounds upon the Texas statistic, 
stating that this legalization scheme “effectively circumvent[ed] the exclusion of Texas from the 
formal program.” Id. 
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communism in Latin America.124 On either rationale¾the authority to 
enter into international agreements, or to advance policy interests 
abroad¾the bracero program and the executive’s exercise of foreign 
affairs power go hand-in-hand. This principle endures especially given 
that the program had a major effect on immigration that colors the 
United States’ relationship with Mexico today. In short, the bracero 
program, as do the following two examples, lie at the nexus of 
immigration policy and foreign affairs power. 
B. “FOREIGN-BORN ORPHANS” 
A different type of executive power¾the commander-in-chief 
power¾was at play in President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 1956 policy 
statement regarding foreign-born orphans adopted by U.S. citizens. 
Arguably, many of his executive actions have considerable import, as 
they were the first slew of executive immigration actions since the INA’s 
passage over President Truman’s veto in 1952. Eisenhower issued a 
policy statement on foreign-born orphans in 1956. He took issue with 
the nationality quota system in the INA (as originally enacted) and the 
Refugee Relief Act.125 The exhaustion of these quotas, which persisted in 
immigration law since the 1920s,126 prevented many United States 
citizens, who adopted foreign-born, non-U.S. citizen children, from 
bringing those children to the United States.127 Indeed, the existing 
scheme under the then-current INA made citizenship of a foreign-born 
child contingent upon at least two years of permanent residency. Thus, 
the inability to bring these children into the United States had the 
added detriment of delaying the naturalization process of those who 
were already adopted by United States citizens.128 Eisenhower was 
especially sensitive to the status of many of these adoptive parents as 
members of the armed forces who had adopted children during their 
missions abroad.129 
As a remedy to the foreign-born orphans situation, Eisenhower 
consulted the Attorney General and the Secretary of State to see if there 
was a solution “within the framework of existing law.”130 Evidently, 
there was such a solution, and over 900 foreign-born adoptees were 
	
 124. See U.C. Davis Dep’t of Agric. Econ., supra note 108. 
 125. Statement by the President Concerning the Entry into the United States of Adopted  
Foreign-Born Orphans, 1956 PUB. PAPERS 1033, 1033 (Oct. 26, 1956). 
 126. See generally Emergency Quota Act of 1921, Pub. L. No. 67-5, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5 (limiting the 
immigration of aliens into the United States). 
 127. See Statement, supra note 125, at 1033. 
 128. See INA § 323(a)(3), ch. 447, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (articulating the two-year requirement). 
 129. See Statement, supra note 125, at 1033. 
 130. Id. 
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able to enter the United States pursuant to the policy.131 Eisenhower 
concluded by stating: “Provision for bringing these orphans into our 
country, pending action by Congress to amend the law, will be put into 
effect immediately.”132 
The heart of the inquiry is whether Eisenhower invoked some type 
of foreign affairs power in issuing the 1956 statement. Similar to DACA, 
it was not a literal “executive order,” but rather an enunciation of 
enforcement intent, and it pertained to families with non-citizen 
members seeking residence in the United States. In explicit relation to 
foreign affairs power, it is impossible to overlook that the Eisenhower 
statement specifically addresses adoptive parents who were 
servicemembers. This arose out of a particular moment in American 
history. In consequence of the Korean War as well as the rebuilding of 
Europe and Japan after World War II, many members of the armed 
forces overseas adopted “foreign-born” children.133 Indeed, Congress at 
this time specifically considered emergency legislation that would have 
amended the Refugee Relief Act in order to allow for more “orphan 
visas”¾an action that the Department of State at the time considered as 
grounded in foreign affairs.134 It is worth remembering, however, that 
the foreign-born orphans statement only refers to servicemembers in a 
general sense, and does not refer to the servicemembers in Korea, 
Japan, and Europe specifically. The circumstances described above are 
probative of context only. 
The president’s commander-in-chief power is a foreign affairs 
power, and it illuminates the background of the 1956 foreign-born 
orphan policy. This conclusion flows from the specific citation of 
American servicemembers in the statement, as well as in the historical 
context. Of course, commander-in-chief power cannot be construed to 
afford the president the power to micromanage the lives of people who 
happen to serve in the armed forces.135 However, the view of what this 
	
 131. See id.; see also Executive Grants of Temporary Immigration Relief, 1956–Present, AM. 
IMMIGR. COUNCIL (2014),https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research 
/executive_grants_of_temporary_immigration_relief_1956-present_final_0.pdf (indicating 923 
orphans as beneficiaries of the Eisenhower policy). 
 132. Statement, supra note 125, at 1033–34. 
 133. See Eleana Kim, The Origins of Korean Adoption: Cold War Geopolitics and Intimate 
Diplomacy 4 (U.S.-Kor. Inst. at Johns Hopkins Sch. Advanced Int’l Stud., Working Paper No. 09-09, 
2009). Indeed, nearly all of the “inter-country adoptions” by American servicemembers in 1954 were 
Japanese children. Id. at 21 n.16. 
 134. 35 DEP’T ST. BULL. 45, 75 (1956); accord Kim, supra note 133, at 10. 
 135. Cf. David Luban, On the Commander in Chief Power, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 477, 484–85 (2008) 
(discussing the narrowness of the Commander-in-Chief power); see also id. at 487 (“[Foreign affairs 
authority] might be thought to subsume the commander in chief authority.”). David Luban 
illustrates in his article On Commander in Chief Power that the power most recently reached a 
zenith during the George W. Bush Administration, in response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist 
attacks. See id. at 568–69. The President cannot, however, invoke his Commander-in-Chief power to 
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commander-in-chief power entails has waxed and waned, both legally 
and academically, over time. It seems to follow, then, that the president 
might invoke his commander-in-chief power, even when not “making 
war,” when soldiers are explicitly involved. The 1956 foreign-born 
orphan policy specifically indicated servicemembers as the parties 
affected by the policy, after over a decade of the United States being a 
warring or occupying force in Europe and Asia. An invocation of 
commander-in-chief power arises not only out of the parties affected, 
but the situation that led to their adopting foreign-born orphans in the 
first place. 
C. THE STUDENTS OF TIANANMEN SQUARE 
The senior President Bush’s administration saw executive action 
pertaining to Chinese nationals in the United States, a reaction to the 
1989 pro-democracy protests in the People’s Republic of China. 
Congress later enacted legislation in accordance with the executive 
order. Beginning in April 1989, several thousand Chinese university 
students marched on Tiananmen Square in Beijing, demanding a 
governmental shift toward democracy in light of the recent death of 
Chinese Communist Party leader Hu Yaobang.136 As the protests grew 
and continued for almost two months, Beijing was placed under martial 
law,137 whereby the Chinese armed forces violently suppressed the 
protest in Tiananmen Square by June 5.138 The protests and the martial 
law that followed left the country in disarray even after the protests’ 
suppression.139 
The following year, President George H. W. Bush issued Executive 
Order 12711¾entitled “Policy Implementation with Respect to 
Nationals of the People’s Republic of China”¾in response to the 
protests and consequent upheaval in Mainland China.140 The order 
provided for a number of protections directed toward Chinese nationals 
in the United States, including: (1) deferred deportation of any Chinese 
nationals who were in the United States from June 5, 1989 (the date the 
protests were forcibly suppressed) and April 11, 1990 (the date of the 
	
affect the lives and businesses of civilians, as the Youngstown majority opinion iterated. See 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952). 
 136. E.g., Nicholas D. Kristof, Chinese Students March for Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.  
18, 1989, at A3. 
 137. E.g., Beijing Is Placed Under Martial Law—Protestors Defy Order to Disperse; Zhao 
Reportedly Has Resigned, SEATTLE TIMES, May 19, 1989, at A1; Martial Law Declared in Beijing 
—Protesters Block Troops; TV Reporters Restricted, AUSTIN AM. STATESMAN, May 20, 1989, at A1. 
 138. See, e.g., Nicholas D. Kristof, Turmoil in China; Foreboding Grasps Beijing; Army Units 
Crisscross City; Foreigners Hurry to Leave, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1989, at A1. 
 139. See id. 
 140. Exec. Order No. 12711, 3 C.F.R. 13897 § 1 (1990). 
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order) until January 1, 1994;141 (2) waiver of various documentation 
requirements required for residence and reentry to the United States;142 
and (3) employment authorization through January 1, 1994.143 The 
order also provided for “enhanced consideration . . . for individuals 
from any country” articulating a fear of “forced abortion or coerced 
sterilization” upon return to their home country based upon that 
country’s policies144¾a probable nod to China’s then-current “one-child 
policy.” 145 The terms of Executive Order 12711 were solidified through 
legislation upon the passage of the Chinese Student Protection Act in 
1992.146 
While similarities between Executive Order 12711 and DACA can be 
drawn, they are superficial. Both policies delay the removal of people 
who are nonetheless formally removable. Furthermore, both policies 
have time-based boundaries of applicability and contemplate 
employment authorization.147 Nonetheless, the comparison is not truly 
on-point. In 1992, the Democrat-controlled Congress ratified 
Republican President Bush’s actions through the Chinese Student 
Protection Act two years after the executive order. On the other hand, 
the Republican-controlled Congress in 2015 and 2016 held hearings on 
whether the Obama policies were constitutional, as a threshold 
matter.148 In the House Judiciary Committee hearing, Congressman 
Goodlatte disputed relying on the Executive Order 12711 as precedent, 
stating that President Bush’s actions were authorized by the INA.149 On 
the other hand, as Congressman Goodlatte stated, the Obama 
Administration acted “[w]ithout any crisis in a foreign country to justify 
[the President’s] actions, . . . granting deferred action without any 
statutory authorization, . . . [and] clearly exceed[ing] his constitutional 
authority.”150 
	
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. § 2. 
 143. Id. § 3(c). 
 144. Id. § 4 (cross-referencing the Attorney General’s then-new regulation, Refugee Status, 
Withholding of Deportation, and Asylum; Burden of Proof, 55 Fed. Reg. 2,803 (Jan. 29, 1990) (to be 
codified at 8 C.F.R. § 205.5(b)). 
 145. See generally, W.X. Zhu, The One Child Family Policy, 88 ARCHIVES DISEASE CHILDHOOD 
463, 463 (2003) (describing the Chinese government’s hope that there will be a shift towards the 
“small family culture”). 
 146. See Chinese Student Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-404, 106 Stat. 1969. 
 147. Compare Exec. Order No. 12711 § 3(c) (establishing employment authorization for the 
applicable Chinese nationals), with DACA MEMORANDUM, supra note 2, at 3 (allowing U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services to accept applications to determine eligibility for work 
authorization). 
 148. See House Deferred Action Hearing, supra note 44; Senate Deferred Action Hearing, supra 
note 48. 
 149. House Deferred Action Hearing, supra note 44, at 3. 
 150. Id. 
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The congressman’s comment gets at the heart of President Bush’s 
invocation of foreign affairs power in issuing Executive Order 12711. 
Before considering this issue, it must be said that setting a bright line at 
a “crisis in a foreign country” before taking executive action is 
misplaced. Indeed, an action like the bracero program hardly meets the 
definition of a “crisis in a foreign country” and occurred without 
statutory authorization. Similarly, the foreign-born orphans policy did 
not arise out of a “crisis” in the usual sense¾in fact, that statement and 
the Obama-era deferred action policies both attempt to ward off family 
disunity, a “crisis” albeit on a personal level, not an international one. 
The point remains, however, that President Bush’s executive order was 
in reaction to an international crisis, and nationals of that 
country¾some eligible for deportation¾remained in the United States. 
Surely, it would be inhumane to apply the U.S. laws governing 
deportation so much by rote as to deport people to their native country 
that had just called in its army to suppress a pro-democracy series of 
protests. Thus, Executive Order 12711 invoked the executive’s foreign 
affairs power¾generally, to promote the United States’ foreign affairs, 
and particularly, to take a stance against what the federal government 
viewed as the bloody stifling of democracy and free expression 
abroad.151 
D. LESSONS FROM THREE EXECUTIVE ACTIONS 
These immigrant-inclusive executive actions, which all invoked the 
president’s foreign affairs power to some degree, are noteworthy 
precisely because of their uncontroversial nature. That these actions did 
not cause sustained friction in Congress or the federal judiciary 
indicates a view that these presidents were operating within their 
proper sphere of power. Because (1) there is no clear statutory  
through-line giving the president this power; (2) the actions involved 
foreign nationals or the United States’ interaction with foreign nations; 
and (3) the president has plenary power to conduct foreign affairs, it 
follows that the actions described in Parts IV.A. through IV.C. were 
reasonable exercises of the president’s foreign affairs power. 
Therefore, another part of the rule that will be discussed in Part V 
emerges: the president reasonably exercises foreign affairs power over 
immigration when his actions can be called “individual presidential 
	
 151. Both the President and members of Congress denounced the actions of the Chinese 
government as soon as they happened. See, e.g., Robert D. McFadden, The West Condemns the 
Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1989. Accord Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012) 
(“Returning an alien to his own country may be deemed inappropriate even where he has committed 
a removable offense or fails to meet the criteria for admission. The foreign state may be mired in civil 
war, complicit in political persecution, or enduring conditions that create a real risk that the alien or 
his family will be harmed upon return.”). 
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foreign affairs power.” Individual presidential foreign affairs power 
includes presidential power either expressly authorized by the 
Constitution (for example, commander-in-chief power, pertaining to 
the foreign-born orphans policy) or existing by virtue of sovereign 
authority (for example, entering into non-treaty international 
agreements, or promoting foreign affairs interests in time of 
international crisis). There are doubtless other categories in the field of 
“individual presidential foreign affairs,” however, those are best 
determined based upon a case-by-case basis. Express statutory 
delegation will be discussed below.152 
V.  SYNTHESIZING A THEORY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWER  
ON EXECUTIVE IMMIGRATION ACTIONS 
Part III of this Note concluded by stating that the president may 
exercise his foreign affairs power pertaining to immigration actions, but 
must do so in a manner that respects Congress’s Article I authority. Part 
IV concluded by detailing what an appropriate exercise of this foreign 
affairs power might look like in immigrant-inclusive actions, within the 
parameters of “individual presidential foreign affairs.” Because, even 
from the early days of the Republic,153 the Constitution requires all 
governmental actors to have limits upon their power in order to 
maintain the rule of law, a rule can be synthesized out of the foregoing 
arguments: presidential foreign affairs authority, based on past 
practice, supports the president’s power to offer limited forms of 
immigration relief, at least in the absence of clear congressional 
prohibition, if the president judges that denying such relief might have 
foreign affairs consequences. This rule can be used to delineate the 
limits on the executive’s otherwise plenary diplomatic power when the 
executive acts alone on immigration. 
This rule can be distilled into a framework that may be applied in 
the case of DACA or future similar scenarios where a president 
independently takes an action on immigration that provides relief or 
otherwise acts to keep the immigrants in the nation’s borders. 
Specifically, the president may act on immigration by himself (or 
through an executive department) if the action: (1) does not interfere 
with Congress’s legislative power over immigration, and (2) falls within 
the realm of “individual presidential foreign affairs powers.” 
	
 152. See infra Part V.A. 
 153. In The Federalist, for example, Alexander Hamilton explained why treaty ratification 
required the advice and consent of the Senate rather than being vested in the President alone. To 
Hamilton, the President should have his treaty-making authority checked by the legislature, since 
“[a]n ambitious man might make his own aggrandizement, by the aid of a foreign power, the price of 
his treachery to his constituents” were the President alone able to conclude treaties. THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 74, 522 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry B. Dawson ed., 1863). 
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Application of this conjunctive test is ultimately up to a court to 
decide, based upon given facts. The following sections present one 
possible way in which a court might apply this test. 
A. THE ACTION MUST “NOT INTERFERE WITH CONGRESS’S  
LEGISLATIVE POWER OVER IMMIGRATION”  
Determining Congress’s legislative power over immigration 
requires a close reading of the Naturalization Clause. The 
Naturalization Clause grants Congress the power to create a uniform 
rule of naturalization, a process to create more citizens and to govern 
their behavior while in the United States.154 Moreover, it is a uniform 
rule. It allows uniformity of negotiation and governance, so that 
“foreign countries concerned about the status, safety, and security of 
their nationals in the United States [can] confer and 
communicate . . . with one national sovereign, not the 50 separate 
States.”155 
Congress has enacted a number of immigration laws that fall 
within its Article I power. Arizona v. United States provides some 
guidance on determining the scope of presidential foreign affairs 
authority over immigration. Arizona considered whether federal law 
preempted the State of Arizona’s then-recently enacted statutory 
scheme that gave state officials considerable power over undocumented 
immigrants.156 In interpreting whether each provision of the Arizona 
law was preempted, the Court expounded upon what Congress’s actual 
authority over immigration entailed. Although this analysis was 
originally provided to contrast state-versus-federal power over 
undocumented immigrants, it is probative of the nature of Congress’s 
power to legislate on immigration matters, generally speaking. In the 
Court’s view, congressional power over immigration included: (1) 
determining the entry requirements of immigrants, and allowing for 
removal procedures157; (2) requiring immigrants to register solely with 
the federal government158; (3) regulating the employment of 
undocumented immigrants159; (4) regulating when an immigrant can be 
	
 154. Cf. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 155. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2498. 
 156. See id. at 2497–98. 
 157. See id. at 2499. 
 158. “As it did in Hines, the Court now concludes that, with respect to the subject of alien 
registration, Congress intended to preclude states from ‘complement[ing] the federal law, or 
enforc[ing] additional or auxiliary regulations.’” Id. at 2503 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 
52, 66–67 (1941), insertions in original). 
 159. “Congress enacted IRCA as a comprehensive framework for ‘combating the employment of 
illegal aliens.’” Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2504 (quoting Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB,  
535 U.S. 137, 147 (2002)). 
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detained during the removal process;160 and (5) allowing state officials 
to verify immigration status during an authorized, lawful detention by a 
state or local officer.161 
The list indicated above is not exhaustive. Nonetheless, where a 
president attempts to act in a manner that falls within one or more of 
these areas of congressional action, this prong of the immigration-
foreign affairs power rule will not be satisfied. Moreover, any action 
would also have to respect the basic constitutional rights with which 
Congress has been entrusted,162 such as due process of the law, equal 
protection of the laws,163 and First Amendment rights. As such, this 
constitutional compliance step may properly be called the “zero step” of 
this analysis. 
Congressional acquiescence goes hand-in-hand with the discussion 
on congressional authority, to recall the Supreme Court’s reasoning in 
Dames & Moore.164 While many members of Congress voiced their 
disagreement, the voices of individual representatives or senators do 
not equal congressional action. As DACA reached its fifth anniversary 
unrevoked and without meaningful abrogation or ratification by 
Congress, this evidence of congressional acquiescence must support the 
view that the policy did not interfere with Congress’s legislative power 
over immigration. 
Not every action the president may take on immigration acts to 
keep immigrants in the country’s borders. What to make of situations 
like section 212(f) of the INA, wherein Congress has specifically 
delegated the president expansive power to exclude? After all, that 
section reads, in relevant part: 
Whenever the President finds that the entry of any aliens or any class 
of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests 
of the United States, he may by proclamation, suspend the entry of all 
aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or 
impose on the entry of aliens any restriction he may deem to be 
appropriate. 165 
	
 160. Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2505. The Court went on to state that this regulation also prohibited 
state officers from “mak[ing] warrantless arrests of aliens based on possible removability except in 
specific limited circumstances.” Id. at 2507. 
 161. Id. at 2509. 
 162. Although these rights have been viewed as applying against all governmental actors, the text 
of the Constitution specifically applies them to legislative matters. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I 
(“Congress shall make no law” abridging freedoms of religion, the press, speech, petition, or 
assembly) (emphasis added); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have the power to 
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”). 
 163. Although the Fourteenth Amendment, requiring equal protection, is written regarding the 
states, the doctrine of reverse incorporation applied it to the federal government as well. See Bolling 
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 498–99 (1954). 
 164. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981). 
 165. INA § 212(f) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f)(2012)). 
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Section 212(f) pertains to immigrant-exclusive actions, or executive 
actions that act as a bar or restriction on entry. As such, this is outside 
of this Note’s scope. However, while this power might sound 
expansive—a wholesale legislative concession to the president to act on 
immigration as he sees proper—in practice, it was not so prior to 2017. 
From 1981 to 2016, aliens excluded under section 212(f) had to belong 
to discrete, well-defined classes of people who performed acts that 
might threaten national security, such as “engaging in malicious  
cyber-enabled activities” or engaging in a coup d’état.166 Furthermore, 
removing immigrants or barring them from entry implicates due 
process considerations167 that actions to permit immigrants to continue 
residing in the United States do not. 
B. THE ACTION MUST “FALL WITHIN THE REALM OF ‘INDIVIDUAL 
PRESIDENTIAL FOREIGN AFFAIRS POWERS’” 
For an executive action to satisfy the second prong of this rule, it 
must fall within the realm of “individual presidential foreign affairs 
powers.” As explained throughout Part IV, these “individual 
presidential foreign affairs powers” include: (1) power granted expressly 
through the Constitution, such as commander-in-chief power (the 
“foreign-born orphans” statement) or recognition power (Zivotofsky v. 
Kerry168); (2) power invoked pursuant to an international agreement 
not rising to the level of a treaty (the bracero program); and (3) power 
invoked in response to larger international concerns (United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.), especially when nationals of the affected 
foreign country are in the United States (Executive Order 12711). 
These examples raise an important issue: If the president may 
navigate only within these and similar areas a court might designate as 
“individual presidential foreign affairs powers,” is the president’s 
foreign affairs power truly plenary? This Note posits that it still is. 
Boundaries to the power are necessary lest a president argue that 
everything he does relating to immigrants is “diplomatic” in nature, 
thereby causing gridlock with Congress and cloaking himself in quasi-
dictatorial power. The power is still plenary within these boundaries. 
This is the overarching theme of having a federal government exercising 
	
 166. KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44743, EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY TO EXCLUDE 
ALIENS: IN BRIEF 6–10 (2017). 
 167. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be deprived of . . . liberty . . . without due process 
of law . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896). 
 168. In Zivotofsky v. Kerry, the Court held that, constitutionally, the power to recognize foreign 
nations resided solely in the President. 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2094 (2015). This prevented the American 
parents of a child born in Jerusalem from listing the child’s place of birth as “Jerusalem, Israel” (versus 
“Jerusalem”) on the child’s United States passport, contrary to a congressional act. Id. at 2096. 
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limited delegated powers pursuant to a written constitution—that 
freedom requires powers to be exercised within limits. 
C. APPLICATION TO DACA AND DAPA 
Upon application of this test to DACA and DAPA, these Obama-era 
immigration policies pass the first prong of the rule set forth above. The 
deferred action policies do not trammel upon Congress’s Article I 
legislative power. The policies do not attempt to regulate the actions of 
immigrants, documented or not, during their time in the United States. 
It is possible to argue that the policies interfere with removal 
procedures regarding the immigrants who were “inadmissible at the 
time of entry,” as the Arizona Court considered.169 However, the merits 
of this argument are in question. The policies do not create new swaths 
of immigrants who are deportable, or create de facto amnesty for 
undocumented immigrants already in the United States. This is 
apparent on the face of the policies¾the government’s guarantee 
through DACA is nonbinding,170 and the DAPA policy specifically states 
that it guarantees “no substantive right, immigration status or pathway 
to citizenship.”171 The nonbinding nature of the policies reinforces their 
exercise as enforcement discretion, rather than a substantive change in 
the law that would require congressional input. Choosing how to 
enforce the nation’s immigration laws is peculiar to the executive 
branch as a separation-of-powers principle, and because it would be 
impossible “to coherently identify a set of congressional priorities for 
immigration enforcement” by performing a textual analysis on the 
“300-page immigration code.”172 Therefore, it seems as though the 
deferred action policies pass the first prong of the rule. 
The second prong of the rule is where the analysis becomes 
troublesome. In light of the judicial issues that surrounded DAPA, this 
analysis is limited to DACA. The Obama DHS did not establish DACA 
pursuant to an international agreement. The essential inquiry is 
whether DACA serves some foreign affairs end. It would likewise be 
possible to argue that DACA could prevent undocumented immigrants 
from being discharged into potentially hostile environments in their 
home countries, such as Executive Order 12711 under President Bush’s 
Administration. President Obama expounded upon the policy 
underlying DACA at the press conference where the policy was 
announced. He stated: “Imagine you’ve done everything right your 
entire life . . . only to suddenly face the threat of deportation to a 
	
 169. Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012). 
 170. See DACA MEMORANDUM, supra note 2, at 3. 
 171. DAPA MEMORANDUM, supra note 3, at 5. 
 172. Cox & Rodríguez, supra note 58, at 110. 
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country that you know nothing about, with a language that you may not 
even speak.”173 Although DACA’s beneficiaries hail from many different 
countries¾not all of which might be rent by war or other domestic 
turmoil¾President Obama’s statement hearkens to an underlying 
presumption that they might. Furthermore, the military service 
provision of DACA,174 as well as President Obama’s specific 
contemplation that DACA would help “a young person who is serving in 
our military, protecting us and our freedom,”175 call upon the 
president’s constitutional authority over the military, in penumbral 
fashion. Furthermore, although not an example of individual 
presidential foreign affairs power, larger concerns of international 
amity were at stake with DACA. In this respect, the decline in tourism to 
the United States after President Trump’s Executive Orders 13769 and 
13780 indicate the pitfalls of being perceived as a nation unfriendly to 
foreigners.176 
Thus, it appears that DACA, at least, might pass the rule 
enunciated in this Note. However, reasonable minds can differ. At the 
very least, though, this framework affords an alternative to the Obama-
era stalemate between Congress and the executive branch over DACA. 
This stalemate ensued in the controversies that DACA and DAPA 
provoked regarding the APA and the Take Care Clause. This proposed 
new framework specifically avoids implicating those legal or 
constitutional provisions. 
CONCLUSION 
On March 9, 2015, forty-seven Republican U.S. Senators drafted an 
open letter to the leaders of Iran regarding the then-current nuclear 
negotiations between Iran and the United States.177 Naturally, this letter 
encroached upon the executive branch’s authority to transact 
international relations, as it did not conform to any legal, theoretical, or 
historical bases for exercising foreign affairs power. Since the president 
	
 173. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on Immigration (June 15, 2012), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/15/remarks-president-immigration. 
 174. See DACA MEMORANDUM, supra note 2, at 1. 
 175. Obama, supra note 173. 
 176. See, e.g., Christopher Muther, You Could Call US Tourism a Victim of Trump’s Travel Ban, 
BOSTON GLOBE (Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/lifestyle/travel/2017/02/14/ 
trump-ban-causes-tourism-drop-and-industry-fears-lasting-effect/yzMAVzeLvqywP8gEekoFsL/ 
story.html. 
 177. See Letter from Tom Cotton et al., U.S. Senators, to the Leaders of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran (Mar. 9, 2015), https://web.archive.org/web/20150311023113/http://www.cotton.senate.gov/ 
sites/default/files/150309%20Cotton%20Open%20Letter%20to%20Iranian%20Leaders.pdf; see 
also Press Release, Sen. Tom Cotton, Cotton and 46 Fellow Senators Send Open Letter to the 
Leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Mar. 9, 2015), https://www.cotton.senate.gov; Peter Baker, 
G.O.P. Senators’ Letter to Iran About Nuclear Deal Angers White House, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2015, 
at A1. 
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is the only constitutional actor with the authority to interact with 
foreign dignitaries,178 the drafting and publication of the letter was 
arguably an act without constitutional authority. 
The purpose of discussing the Iran letter is not to set up a tu 
quoque argument (“If the Republicans can thwart the Democrats’ 
constitutional duties, why can’t the Democrats do the same?”). Rather, 
it reveals how the branches of government encroach on each other’s 
authority¾often in shows of political posturing¾all the time. This 
intrusion can occur even in area like national security and foreign 
affairs, where the president’s power is usually regarded with extreme 
deference. This interplay is an inherent risk of having a government 
composed of three coequal branches, all governing a diverse and often 
rancorous body politic. 
Largely, this Note rebuts the uncomplicated view of executive 
power over immigration law that many commentators put forth since 
the DHS announced DACA in 2012 up to President Trump’s litany of 
executive orders on immigration in early 2017. The public’s views on 
these two presidents’ actions often wafted like a feather in the political 
breeze. Some condemn DACA as executive overreach while esteeming 
President Trump’s “travel ban” judicially unreviewable—and vice versa. 
A new framework is necessary as long as the federal government 
continues to stalemate on the issue of immigration, and the American 
citizenry continues to demand change in one direction and then the 
other. 
Admittedly, the argument posed in this Note is novel. Immigration 
is an oddity in the United States legal system, and the constitutional 
rights of immigrants¾especially undocumented ones¾remain 
convoluted.179 Furthermore, the presidency has transformed by leaps 
and bounds since the days of the Framers. President Washington 
considered the presidency an office of the nation’s “Chief Magistrate,”180 
an administrative responsibility. Compare this with the election of 
2016, where rhetoric around the presidency seemed to reflect a 
	
 178. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall receive Ambassadors and other public 
Ministers.”). 
 179. See generally Rubenstein & Gulasekaram, supra note 59; see also I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 
468 U.S. 1032, 1038–39 (1984) (stating that removal proceedings do not require proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt; Fourth Amendment-based exclusionary rules are inapplicable; Ex Post Facto 
Clause does not apply in removal cases; the Eighth Amendment does not require bail to be granted in 
removal cases); see also Ray v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 582, 586 (9th Cir. 2006) (“Because a deportation 
hearing is a civil proceeding involving non-citizens, aliens involved in such proceedings do not enjoy 
the full panoply of constitutional rights that American citizens would enjoy in a criminal 
proceeding.”). But see Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 101 (1903) (requiring removal proceedings to 
conform to Fifth Amendment due process); Elizabeth A. Rossi, Revisiting INS v. Lopez-Mendoza: 
Why the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule Should Apply in Deportation Proceedings,  
44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 477, 526 (2013). 
 180. President George Washington, Second Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1793). 
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perception that the president is directly and personally responsible for 
creating jobs, passing laws, and ensuring the nation’s health and 
greatness.181 As the people of the United States look to the president, 
and not a deadlocked Congress to set immigration law and policy, a 
clearer framework for the president’s power is necessary. 
 
   
This is the riddle of immigration law in the United States: that a 
nation that passed the Chinese Exclusion Act into law in 1882 also 
produced Emma Lazarus’s poem “The New Colossus” scarcely more 
than a year later. All of the preceding analysis aside, it is worth 
remembering that immigration law and policy in the United States is 
not really about passports, visas, statutes, constitutional provisions, and 
sovereign power. In short, immigration law is not really about 
immigration “law.” Immigration law, as wave after wave of 
discrimination since the nineteenth century has illustrated, is about the 
nexus of race, class, and religion with the prevailing policy of dominant 
social classes. Until that becomes the background for conceptualizing 
immigration law, this field will remain condemned to an eternal  
tug-o’-war in the courts, in Congress, in the White House, and on the 
streets. 
 
	
 181. See, e.g., Carmen Fishwick & Guardian readers, Why Did People Vote for Donald Trump? 
Voters Explain, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 9, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/ 
nov/09/why-did-people-vote-for-donald-trump-us-voters-explain. 
